MONT ST. JEAN

Battle of Waterloo, June 18 th 1815

“In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions….”

[The Art of War by Sun Tzu, vi. Weak points and Strong, xxv.]

The site selected by Wellington at which he would confront Napoleon faced almost due north and south. The land was formed by a series of quite shallow ridges and troughs of sufficient magnitude for Wellington to employ his favoured tactic of preserving the bulk of his infantry on the reverse slope, thereby protecting it from the expected onslaught of massed French artillery. The Allied left was at the hamlet of La Haye, the centre was the farm of La Haye Sainte, and the right at the châteaux of Hougomont. It would be easy here to venture into a battalion by battalion layout of Wellington’s dispositions, but that is not why we are here, so therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on the dispositions of the 33 rd and 51 st regiments.

“On the right of Kielmansegge’s Hanoverian Brigade, [of the Allied-Anglo front line] was posted the 5 th British Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir Colin Halkett and comprising the 2 nd Battalion the 30 th, 1 st Battalion the 33 rd, 2 nd Battalion the 69 th, and the 2 nd Battalion the 73 rd British regiments. Its position was more forward than that of the other portion of Alten’s Division, with which its front was in an oblique direction, its right shoulders having been brought forward so as to preserve the parallelism between the general line and the crest of the main ridge. The 2 nd battalions of the 73 rd and 30 th formed contiguous Columns of Companies at quarter distance, the former right, the latter left in front; and at a deploying interval for two battalions from the head of the column formed by the Bremen Battalion. The other two battalions of this brigade, the 1 st Battalion the 33 rd and the 2 nd Battalion the 69 th Regiments were formed in Contiguous Columns of Companies at quarter distance, in Second Line, and in right rear of the 73 rd and 30 th Regiments; the 33 rd Right, and the 69 th Left, in front.”

[The Waterloo Campaign, 1815, by William Siborne, pp., 336-7]

Possibly the reason for placing the 33 rd and the 69 th to the rear of the 30 th and the 73 rd was because they had suffered heavy casualties at Quatre Bras, and therefore could no longer provide a full battalion frontage by company.

The aficionados of this campaign, and there are many, they will know that the Division next right to von Alten’s was the 1 st British Division, commanded by Major General Cooke, and comprised the 1 st and 2 nd Brigades of British Foot Guards. To this section of the Allied line would fall the final act of this bloody field, it can therefore be said with some confidence, that the 33 rd was to be – right in the thick of things – as will be revealed.

“The 1 st Brigade was commanded by Major General Maitland, and comprising the 2 nd and 3 rd Battalions of the 1 st Regiment of Foot Guards, formed the left brigade of the Division. The 3 rd Battalion stood in Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, on the crest of the ridge; and between it and the head of the right column of Halkett’s Brigade, there was a deploying interval for one battalion. The 2 nd Battalion was placed in right read of the 3 rd, also in Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, it was on the reverse slope, and immediately under the crest of the ridge.”

[Ibid, pp. 337-8]

The deployment of many Allied units in ‘Columns of Companies’, rather than the more normal two lines of infantry was explained succinctly by Captain (later General Sir) James Shaw Kennedy, who was then acting on Wellington’s Quartermaster-General’s staff:

“The French cavalry had, on the 16 th, proved itself very formidable at Quatre Bras in its attack … That cavalry, in immensely augmented numbers, was now forming opposite … and the ground between them and us presented no obstacle whatever. It was at the same time evident, from the way in which the French guns were taking up their ground, that the (army) would be exposed to a severe artillery fire. It was therefore, of the highest importance that the formations … should be such that … [their] passing from line into a formation for resisting cavalry should be as rapid as possible … To carry these views into effect the strong battalions formed each an oblong on the two centre companies, and when the battalions were weak, two were joined, the right-hand battalion of the two forming left in front, and the left-hand battalion right in front, each in columns of companies. the fronts of the oblongs were formed by four companies; the rear face of the oblongs by the same strength; and the sides of one company each, which were formed by the outward wheel of the subdivisions. It will be observed that, when a battalion forms oblong in this manner upon two centre companies, the formation is made in less than half the time in which it would form a square on a flank company; and the same applies to deployment.”

[ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 271]

It is plain from the above that the sacrifice of Halkett’s 5 th Brigade at Quatre Bras had not been made in vane, and that the ever adaptable Wellington had taken note of the effect of large units of French heavy cavalry on his own infantry. By forming many of his battalions in this ‘oblong’ formation, he hoped to reduce, and even prevent a further occurrence.

The 51 st, of which to date we have heard little were deployed thus:

“The abrupt termination of the ridge along which the Allied front line was posted, at its point of junction with the Nivelles road, was in the direct rear of the buildings of Hougomont.

On the other side of the road, this termination presented a sudden and bold, though short, slope down into the long valley, which, after sweeping by Hougomont proceeds in the direction of Merbe Braine. A portion of the slope, including the summit was covered with brushwood, and its base was bounded by a horse path partially lined with a stunted hedge, forming altogether, excellent cover for Light Infantry. On the other side of the valley, the ground ascends, at first abruptly, and then gradually, to the summit of that portion of the main ridge upon which the Left of the French army rested; and from the point of junction of the Avenue conducting to Hougomont with the Great Nivelles Road, a narrow road leads directly up the opposite slope and stretches across the ridge or plateau in the direction of Braine la Alleud.

Along a portion of this road, principally consisting of a hollow way, were posted in advance, some Light Troops of the Anglo-Allied army. The formed a part of the 4 th Brigade of the 4 th Division (under Colonel Mitchell), attached to the 2 nd Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Lord Hill. The Brigade consisted of the 3 rd Battalion of the 14 th Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel Tidy), of the 23 rd Fusiliers (under Colonel Sir Henry Ellis), and of the 51 st British Light Infantry(under Lieutenant Colonel Rice), which troops were disposed in the following manner.

Along that portion of the Hougomont Avenue, which is nearest to the Nivelles road, was extended the Light Company of the 23 rd Regiment, on its right was an abatis [Abatis, Abattis or Abbattis (a French word meaning a heap of material thrown), a term in field fortification for an obstacle formed of the branches of trees laid in a row, with the tops directed towards the enemy and interlaced or tied with wire. The abatis is used alone or in combination with wire entanglements and other obstacles. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abatis], which had been thrown across the Great Road, and close upon the right of this artificial obstacle, a Company of the 51 st Regiment was posted. Four more Companies of this regiment, and the Light Company of the 14 th were extended along the hollow way alluded to as stretching across the ridge, on the extreme left of the French position. The remainder of the 51 st stood in Column of Support, about two hundred yards in rear of the hollow way. The 23 rd Regiment was stationed on the left of the Nivelles road, on the reverse slope, and immediately under the crest of the main ridge, in rear of the 2 nd Brigade of Guards. The 14 th Regiment was posted in column on the southern decent from the plateaux on which was assembled the 2 nd British Division; and from the view which it possessed of the ground occupied by the 51 st, it was well placed as a reserve to the Light Infantry. In a ravine, descending from the immediate right of the skirmishers of the brigade down into the valley, was posted a squadron of the 15 th British Hussars (under Captain Wodehouse) from which a piquet was detached to the right of the abatis, as [and] also an immediate one for keeping up the communication; and some videttes were thrown out to the right, having in their front a continuation of the ravine, possessing a more marked and distinct character.”

[Ibid, pp. 343-6]

“The Anglo-Allied force arrayed on the northern side of the battlefield amounted to 67,661 men and 156 guns. Only 15,000 of the infantry were British, and of these only about 7,000 had ever heard a shot fired in anger;…….”

[[Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 268]

One consideration which also needs to be examined was the weather immediately prior to the battle.

“The May and June of 1815 were very unsettled, and marked by high RAINFALL totals across the Low Countries. In particular, the heavy RAIN-STORMS in the lead up to, and immediately prior to the Battle of Waterloo (17th/18th) across Belgium may have been a contributory factor in the defeat of the Napoleonic French forces - the French cavalry in particular finding it difficult to traverse the rain-sodden ground.”

[ http://homepage.ntlworld.com/booty.weather/climate/1800_1849.htm ]

Another source appears to be far more specific:

“16th June, 1815 (Friday)

12:00 hours: Clear sky hot temperatures with a rainstorm moving in from the south.

18:00 hours: Rain.

19:30 hours: Thunderstorm and heavy rain that subsides before dawn.

17th June, 1815 (Saturday)

08:00 hours: temperatures rising.

12:00 hours: High humidity with hot temperatures. Rainstorms moving in from the West.

15:00 hours: Thunderstorm with downpour.

18:00 hours: Storm breaks up with patches of rain showers.

20:30 hours: Downpour of rain through most of the night Lightens up towards morning.

18th June, 1815 (Sunday)

07:30 hours: Rain stopping. Cool temperatures.

08:00 hours: Rain has stopped.

08:30 hours: Clouds clearing rapidly.

10:30 hours: Clear sky and sunshine. Heat mist rising.

11:00 hours (approximately): Battle starts while ground conditions are still muddy .”

[ http://ucsu.colorado.edu/~trochim/articles/Mudderloo.pdf ]

Provided the above is correct, and there are web sites which contain I suspect very reliable research on this point, all of which however DEMAND payment to even view their articles, that verification is a mute point. This web site DOES NOT AGREE WITH HAVING TO PAY FOR OUR OWN HISTORY!

Anyway, provided the above IS correct, then it can be safely said that the weather favoured the side which employed static tactics, that is to say, the Allied army of the Duke of Wellington, over and above the necessarily more mobile French army of Napoleon Bonaparte. He it was that had to advance his infantry, deploy his formidable artillery, and use his masses of cavalry to shift Wellington off his ridge. All Wellington had to do basically was to stand his ground and wait for the Prussians to outflank the French. What a wait it was to turn into!

Napoleon’s army comprised 71,947 men and 246 guns along a front of about 2½ miles. He had deployed his force in three lines or echelons. The first line ”formed along the Belle Alliance ridge, consisted of two corps. On Napoleon’s right, from the Brussels road east towards Chateaux Frischermont, was d’Erlon’s 1 st Corps. His four infantry divisions, Quiot’s 1 st, Donzelot’s 2 nd, Marcognet’s 3 rd, and Druette’s 4 th, were side by side, each with one brigade behind the other in two lines. Between divisions, d’Erlon had placed artillery batteries, Jacquinot’s light cavalry division, covering the flank of the right wing, observed the Frischermont to Papelotte area. On the left of the road Reille’s 2 nd Corps was positioned in a like manner to d’Erlon’s, with Bachelu’s 5 th, Foy’s 9 th, and Prince Jerome’s 4 th infantry divisions. (Girard’s 7 th had been so savaged at Ligny on the 16 th that it had been left there.) the left wing was covered by Pire’s light cavalry division, posted beyond the Nivelles road.

In Napoleon’s second line, to the east of the Brussels road, behind d’Erlon, was Milhaud’s 4 th Heavy Cavalry Corps, while to the west, behind Reille, was Kellermann’s 3 rd Corps. Between Milhaud and Kellermann, Lobau was placed with Simmer and Jeannin’s infantry divisions one behind the other just to the west of the road, and two cavalry divisions to the east, also in echelon. The third echelon consisted of the Imperial Guard Corps, commanded by Drouot. The Guard infantry, 24 battalions in columns, was placed astride the Brussels road near the farm of Rossomme, several hundred yards in front of the Emperor’s headquarters at Le Caillou. To the east of the road, Lefebvre-Desnouette’s Guard Heavy Cavalry Division was behind Kellermann. ”

[ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 267]

Because of the heavy rain the night before, the ground was extremely muddy, this was after-all Flanders, where a future generation would bleed to death in the self same mud between the years 1914 and 1918. Consequently Napoleon was obliged to delay his initial assault, the opening shots were however fired “At 11:25, Napoleon ordered his trade mark bombardment of the Allied lines using the twenty-four 12 pounders in front of Général de Division d'Erlon's I Corps. To act as a diversion for the oncoming assault Général de Division Bonaparte* attacked the farm of Hougoumont, which was defended by the British Foot Guards. Around 1:00 another forty 6pounders from the I Corps and twenty-four 12pounders from the Imperial Guard making a massed battery of 88 cannon.

[ http://members.allstream.net/~htfergus/thepositions.html ]

The farmhouse and immediate outbuildings of Hougoumont were defended by the Light Companies of the four regiments of Foot Guards then present, with Maitland’s 1 st Brigade, the 2 nd Battalion of the First Foot Guards forming the front line, and the 3 rd Battalion of the First Foot Guards, with, behind them, Byng’s 2 nd Brigade. 2 nd Battalion 2 nd Coldstream Guards, and the 3 rd Battalion of the 3 rd Foot Guards, all acting as a reserve if called for, for the defence of Hougoumont. To the immediate right of these Guards units was Mitchell’s Brigade including the 51 st, as before stated.

The left wing of the French army, opposite Hougomont, was comprised of:

“The Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Reille, comprising three divisions of infantry and one of light cavalry.

Its Right Division, which was the 5 th, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Bachelu, rested its Right upon La Belle Alliance, and was ranged along the descent from thence down into the valley, which, more westward, winds past Hougomont. The 1 st Brigade of this division, under General Husson, consisted of the 2 nd Regiment of Light Infantry and the 61 st Regiment of the Line, the former comprising two, the latter, three, Battalions; the 2 nd Brigade under General Baron Campy, of the 72 nd and 108 th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two and the latter, three, Battalions. The br8igades were deployed in two lines, the second at a distance of 60 yards in rear of the first.

On the left of the 5 th Division, and upon the height facing the southern boundary of Hougomont, stood the 9 th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Foy. Its 1 st Brigade, under General Baron Gauthier, consisted of the 92 nd and 93 rd Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions each. Its 2 nd Brigade, under General Baron Jamin, consisted of the 4 th Infantry of Light Infantry, and of the 100 th Regiment of the Line, each comprising three Battalions. These two brigades were in like manner, deployed in two lines, the second at a distance of 60 yards in rear of the first.

On the left of the 9 th Division and along the ridge of the western boundary of Hougomont, stood the 6 th Division, commanded by Prince Jerome Napoleon [Bonaparte]. Its 1 st Brigade, under General Baron Bauduin, consisted of the 1 st Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 3 rd Regiment of the Line, the former comprising three, the latter, two Battalions. Its 2 nd Brigade, under General Baron Soye, consisted of the 1 st and 2 nd Regiments of the Line, comprising three Battalions each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two lines, the seconds 60 yards in rear of the first.

On the left of the infantry, was posted the Light Cavalry attached to the Corps, namely, the 2 nd Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Piré. Its 1 st Brigade, under General Baron Hubera, consisted of the 1 st and 6 th Chasseurs, and its 2 nd Brigade, under general Mathieu, of the 5 th and 6 th Lancers. It stood across the Nivelles high road, in three deployed lines, rather under the crest of the ridge, on its reverse slope; and threw out piquet’s in the direction of Braine l’Alleud, as also more to its left, thus keeping up a vigilant look-out around this flank of the army. ”

[The Waterloo Campaign, 1815, by William Siborne, pp., 358-9]

Between 11:30 and 11:50 the initial attack was launched. It was meant to test Wellington’s metal, to see how much he needed to protect his right flank. Napoleon’s own younger brother Jerome was given the responsibility of attacking Hougomont farm, his orders were to draw as much of Wellington’s centre across to protect his right as possible. For whatever reasons however, Jerome Bonaparte, perhaps wanting to display his marshal prowess in front of his own brother, got drawn into a fire-fight from which he found it impossible to escape from.

“Encountering very stiff resistance from the Nassauers and Hanoverians around Hougomont Farm and the British guards within that farm, however, Jerome fell into his own trap, recklessly throwing in all four of his regiments, only to be repulsed each time. Then in desperation he finally forced Foy to part with as much as half his own division to satisfy Jerome’s ego in taking what was denied him. Foy protested vigorously but to no avail. After all, Jerome was the Emperor’s brother. Meanwhile Hougomont was reinforced lightly by the Coldstram Guards and the Scots Guards, who continued to repulse everything thrown at them, despite a heavier commitment by Reille. In fact, Reille should have ordered the reckless young Bonaparte back, instead of jeopardising Napoleon’s entire operations, but apparently he was too afraid of the Emperor to chance that. Indeed, any good commander would have attacked Hougomont with howitzers first before committing troops as mere cannon fodder, as Bonaparte was doing.”

“At almost 11:30 a.m., just after Napoleon had taken up position near Rossomme, one of Reille’s batteries opened fire on Wellington’s position above Hougoumont. (Wellington had ordered his batteries not to engage in counter-battery fire) Prince Jerome’s 6 th Division had been ordered to mount the diversionary attack on Hougoumont. His Chief-of-staff, General Count Guillemont, sent forward the division’s 1 st Brigade under General Baron Bauduin to carry out a frontal assault on the wood at the southern end of the Hougoumont estate. Seven battalions advanced in battalion columns in echelon, preceded by their Light Companies in extended skirmish order. At the same time Pire’s lancers went forward along the Maison du Roi-l’Alleud road to a position across the Nivelles road, extending the French left flank partially to envelope the Hougoumont position. British officers with Peninsula experience were surprised to observe the French use of massed troops and the precision of their movements. In the Peninsula, with its rugged terrain, the French had rarely formed up in uniform order of battle as normally occurred on other European fields.

During the short-lived French preliminary bombardment of the Hougoumont wood, Napoleon personally ordered Kellerman’s two horse artillery batteries to go forward and give Bauduin’s attack covering fire. The French light infantry skirmishers charged into the wood with bayonets fixed, only to be decimated and driven back by the intense fire of three companies of the Nassau light battalion and the Hanoverian Jägers who, from the cover of the trees suffered little in return for the casualties they inflicted. But the French massed formations came on in overwhelming strength, driving back the enemy skirmishers. By weight of numbers and constant out-flanking from wherever the defenders’ thin line was pierced, the French maintained a slow advance up through the wood toward the chateaux, but at a high price. The Nassau and Hanoverian light troops fell back skilfully from tree to tree, as Sax-Weimar had done in the Bois de Bossu two days earlier, taking a heavy toll of the packed French formations. Soon the French had also taken up open-order positions, and a point-blank musketry duel ensued, with the French gaining ground due to constant reinforcement from behind. ”

[Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 277]

It had been Napoleon’s intention to launch his main thrust against Wellington’s hopefully weakened centre at 1 o’clock in the afternoon. Just before that time however, movement was detected of a large concentration of troops emerging some eight miles distant to the northeast, in the direction of Wavre. Being then unsure whether it was Grouchy coming across to his support, or the Prussians arriving to aid Wellington, the Emperor delayed operations at the centre until he was sure which army was approaching his otherwise exposed right flank. Napoleon’s choices were simple at this juncture. He could continue with his planned full-scale attack and hope for the arrival of Grouchy; or, he could still execute a strategic withdrawal southwards. Perhaps influenced by his own belief in his prowess and luck, he chose to continue to press the attack, and to trust Grouchy to arrive in time to protect his right flank from the Prussians.

It is not the purview of this article to write yet another narrative of the entire battle. Such a task has been already very adequately accomplished by a considerable number of writers and historians. It does however fall necessary to describe those events in which our two regiments were involved as far as is known. However it will be necessary to allude to certain aspects of the battle as they developed in order to better explain the fates of our two Yorkshire regiments.

At the commencement of the action, the officers of the 33 rd have been listed above, with the necessary subtractions made because of casualties incurred at Quatre Bras:

The 51 st were officered by:

Officers of the 51st Regiment of Foot

Lieutenant Colonel

H. H. Mitchell, Colonel

Major

S. Rice, Lieutenant Colonel

Captains

J. T. Keyt, Major; J. Campbell; W. Thwaits, Major; R. Storer; J. H. Phelps; James Ross; J. Ross; S. Beardsley [w]; E. Frederick

Lieutenants

T. Brook; B.B. Hawley; F. Minchin; W. Mahon; W. H. Hare; O. Ainsworth; H. Read; F. Kennedy; J. Dyas; J. J. Flaman [k]; W. H. Elliot; W. D. Simpson; F. Mainwaring; C. W. Tyndall [w]; H. Martin; H. H. Roberts; E. Isaacson; E. J. Taylor; T. Troward; J. Lintott

Ensigns

G. F. B. St. John; F. Percy; W. K. Krause; R. B. Walton; W. Johnstone; A. Fraser; J. Blair; H. Lock

Paymaster

J. Gibbs

Lieutenant and Adjutant

W. Jones

Quarter Master

T. Askey

Surgeon

R. Webster

Assistant Surgeons

J. F. Clarke

P. Fitzpatrick

[w] = wounded during the battle; [k] = killed during the battle.

The complex of buildings, courtyards, orchards and hedgerows which formed a series of interlocked rectangular enclosures. The court-yarded and walled châteaux and garden formed the main bastion and had been heavily fortified during the night by the four Light Companies of the Guards Division, see above. Units of Hanoverians and Nassaurers had been detailed to defend as best they could for as long as they could the enclosed woods to the south of the châteaux. The previously described first assault on Hougomont continued, with “General Bauduin, conspicuous on horse-back [and no doubt very richly attired], was one of the early casualties, falling shot through. As in the Bois de Bossu, every tree and clump of bushes was contended. The dense foliage and growing pall of gun-smoke from thousands of rounds fired made visibility in the wood extremely limited. It took nearly an hour for Jerome’s 1 st Brigade to clear the wood of its 600 Gernman defenders, who, on reaching the chateaux fell back behind it into an area called “the hollow way”, which was hidden from the view of the French. The chateaux and adjoining buildings were therefore uncovered and their defence rested on the efforts of the troops within – the light companies of the British Foot Guards and three companies of the 1 st Battalion of the 2 nd Regiment of Nassauers.”

[Ibid]

The above plan is not to precise scale, and the content may be contentious, but in the main it depicts the deployment of Allied units in and around Hougoumont farm during the battle of Waterloo with the various French moves to capture it during the day.

These same events described by Siborne ring slightly differently:

“The French columns, as they moved towards Hougomont, were twice checked by the fire from the British batteries; which, having been given with remarkable precision, appeared to cause considerable loss and disorder amongst them. At length they effected their advance. The French Skirmishers, followed by fresh Supports, had, in the mean time, made good their entrance into the wood; and such was the boldness of their advance that they soon drove the Nassau Battalion and Hanoverian Riflemen before them. They were also pushing forward in considerable force across the inclosures adjoining the left of the wood.

“At this moment, Wellington gave orders, in person, to Major Bull’s British Howitzer Horse Battery, which had just been drawn up on that part of the main ridge which was immediately in the rear of the Great Orchard of Hougomont, to dislodge the enemy infantry from those inclosures by means of shells. This service, which, considering the proximity of the Allied troops in the wood, was of a very delicate nature, was executed with admirable skill, and attended with the desired effect. The enemy was forced to abandon the fields in front of the Great orchard; from which the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards now moved on, as did also those of the Second Brigade, from the Lane and Kitchen Garden on the right, to relieve the Nassauers and Hanoverians in the wood. They dashed forward with the most determined resolution, blazing away in the very faces of their opponents, who’s further advance they completely checked; and then gallantly pressing on, they gradually succeeded in clearing the Wood of the French Skirmishers. ”

[The Waterloo Campaign, 1815, by William Siborne, pp., 376-7]

There is a patent need from the two accounts of the same events shown above to explain why there is such a dichotomy of the reportage of these events, and not only these events, but many of the events on the field of Waterloo that day. According to Hamilton-Williams, Siborne had his own agenda when producing what has become THE reference work about the battle. He says “Over the years, many writers and historians have attempted to present other interpretations of the great event, prompted by anomalies which arose from treating the Siborne account as truly definitive. However, to make such an attempt in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and especially in Britain, was considered as the rankest heresy, and, which was worse, ungentlemanly…………..

“The way in which Silborne selectively edited the manuscript material made available to him over the years of his correspondence, and the use he made of other sources, constitutes a catalogue of errors and historical sin and omission. In the first instance, he used only British sources, although even the most rabid ‘patriot’ would be prepared to admit that other nations were represented on the field. Silborne did not consult any Dutch, Belgian, Hanoverian, Prussian, Nassau or Brunswick sources. Apart from the letters of British officers, he was content to rely on The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, edited by Lieutenant- Colonel Gurwood (1836), and Ludlow North Beamish’s History of the King’s German Legion (1832, 1837).

It is plain then, if what Hamilton-Williams says is true, then much of the Silborne account must be treated with the most extreme caution. It is because of this, and because there are no other sources best suited to our purpose here, that this account of the adventures of our two Yorkshire regiments on that day will primarily be composed from their own regimental histories. If anyone then has a problem with this, they can consult as many other sources as they wish, but I doubt that anything more pertinent will be found. The two works concerned are:

History of the Thirty-Third Foot, Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment, by LEE Albert

And

History of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, Volume 1. (51st from 1775 to 1881). WYLLY Colonel H C and BOND Lt Colonel Reginald C.

The relevant pages of these works have been graciously supplied by the National Army Museum, Chelsea, London, to whom go my most sincere thanks for their co-operation.

Designed by Richard Hayton 2006
email richard@yorkshirehistory.com