THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS, JUNE 16 TH

“If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late…..”

[The Art of War by Sun Tzu, vii, Manoeuvring, vi.]

Notwithstanding any of the above, the dispositions of the French had been made, and thus it was at about 5 a.m. on the morning of the 16 th, the leading elements of Ney’s wing began exchanging fire with outlying Allied piquets before Quatre Bras.

“The enemy commenced the operations of the 16th by attacking the troops of the Netherlands, which had been assembled by the Prince of Orange in a position covering the approach to Quatre Bras from Frasnes. –– The troops assembled on this point were, part of the 2d division of the Netherlands, under General Perponcher, whilst the 3d division of the Netherlands, under General Collaert, and the 1st and 3d English divisions, were ordered to march by Nivelles towards the scene of action. The skirmishing commenced at five o’clock in the morning, and continued till mid-day without any decisive movement being made: the troops of the Netherlands, however, being unsupported, began to cede their ground to the superior numbers of the enemy, when Sir Thomas Picton, with the 5th English division, consisting of the 8th British brigade under Sir James Kempt, and the 9th British brigade under Sir Dennis Pack, with the 5th Hanoverian brigade under Colonel Vincke, opportunely arrived to their support, about two o’clock, together with the Brunswick contingent, and almost immediately entered into action. Sir J. Kempt’s brigade, consisting of the 28th, 32d, 79th, and 95th regiments were moved to the left of the position with the 3d battalion of the Royals, forming part of the brigade of Sir D. Pack, who with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the 42d, 44th, and 92d regiments, formed on the great Namur road, and in the corn fields extending to the Bois de Bossu on the right: the 92d were formed in line in the ditch bordering the great road, and were of the greatest service in repelling an attack of the French cavalry, who daringly pursued the Brunswick hussars into the British line, after they had made an unsuccessful attack on the French cavalry.

“The enemy moved down two divisions of infantry supported by cavalry, with intent to force the centre of the British position; their approach was covered by a galling fire of round and grape shot, but the determined courage of the allies withstood this fierce attack; and after a destructive fire in line, the troops formed squares to resist the French cavalry who were now rapidly advancing, and although barely sufficient time was given for a regular formation to receive them, they succeeded in repelling this attempt, which unfortunately caused severe loss to some of the regiments engaged.”

[ http://www.napoleonic-literature.com/Book_29/005-Battle_of_Quatre_Bras.htm ]

Wellington’s response to the news of the French advance of the 15 th was according to Siborn:

“The following were the movements ordered by the Duke. Upon the left of the army, which was nearest the presumed point of attack – Perpnocher’s and Chasse’s Dutch-Belgian divisions were to be assembled that night at Nivelles, on which point Alten’s British division (the 3 rd) was to march as soon as collected at Braine le Comte; but this movement was not to be made until the enemy’s attack upon the right of the Prussian army and the left of the Allied army had become a matter of certainty. Cooke’s British Division (the 1 st), was to be collected that night at Enghien, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

Along the central portion of the army, Clinton’s British Division (the 2 nd) was to be assembled that night at Ath, and to be in readiness also to move at a moment’s notice. Colville’s British Division (the 4 th) was to be collected that night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which were to move to Audenarde.

Upon the right of the army – Stedman’s Dutch-Belgian Division, and Anthing’s Dutch-Belgian (Indian) Brigade, were after occupying Audenarde with 500 men, to be assembled at Sottinghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning.

The cavalry were to be collected that night at Ninhove, with the exception of the 2 nd Hussars of the King’s German Legion, who were to remain on the look-out between the Scheldt and the Lys; and of Dornberg’s Brigade, with the Cumberland Hussars, which were to march that night upon Vilvorde and to bivouac on the high-road near to that town.

The Reserve was thus disposed – Picton’s British Division (the 5 th), the 81 st British Regiment, and Best’s Hanoverian Brigade (of Cole’s Division), were to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment’s notice. Vincke’s Hanoverian Brigade (of Picton’s Division) was to be collected that night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight the following morning to move towards Brussels and to halt on the road between Alost and Assche for further orders. The Duke of Brunswick’s Corps was to be collected that night on the high-road between Brussels and Vilvorde. Kruse’s Nassau Brigade was to be collected at daylight on the following morning upon the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice. The Reserve Artillery was to be in readiness to move at daylight. ”

[The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 by William Siborne, pp. 120-122]

As the morning of the 16 th June dawned Ney’s advance towards the crossroads at Quatre Bras became more apparent, so Wellington sent more and more of his scattered army to that location. However, their initial dispersal meant delays, some units might not arrive in time, and all would be there in their own time, regardless of how hard they were marched. What is more, at this moment in time, Wellington was still unsure of Napoleon’s real intentions, and was reticent about committing all his forces to a single course of action. To reiterate, Napoleon’s plan was simple, it meant he and Grouchy’s wing would push aside Blucher’s Prussians, and prevent them from joining forces with Wellington, while Ney pushed forward along the Nivelles road to occupy Brussels with all dispatch. Napoleon considered that his rapid capture of Brussels would be decisive enough a victory to dissolve the Allied nations ranged against him, and even more, bring about an advantageous peace. “The best-laid plans of mice and men often go awry..” to misquote Robert Burns, must apply here. Had Ney undertaken to obey his orders to the letter, then the consequences might well have been different, but, “Ney had not advanced to secure Quatre Bras on the fifteenth as ordered, preliminary to a triumphal march on Bruxelles [sic], but had instead camped with his main force around Grosselies at eight o’clock that evening. And yet his powerful left wing, some 45,000 strong was clearly in a position to brush aside the Nassauer’s 4,000 men holding Quatre Bras and to drive on to the capital. Meanwhile of course, at the same hour that Ney was ordering his troops to stack arms for the night (at eight o’clock), eight miles to the west of Quatre Bras, at Nivelles, Chief of Staff Constant Rebecque was issuing orders to reinforce Prinz Bernhard at Quatre Bras with General Bijlandt’s Brigade.”

[One Hundred Days, by Alan Schom, Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1992, ISBN 0 7181 3384 6, pp., 258-9]

According to “The Life of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington” by J. H. (Joachim Hayward) Stocqueler, “On the evening of the 15 th, not more than 1,500 Belgians occupied the approaches to Quatre Bras at Frasne, but in the night, a considerable body had moved through the forest of Nevilles, and, when the day broke on the 16 th the French marshal found himself engaged with 8,000 men – under the Prince of Orange and general Perponcher. The Prince of Weimar at first lost ground before the impetuous attacks of the French columns: reinforced, he regained his position, and thus commanded the communications leading from Nivelles to Brussels with Marshal Blucher. The battle raged on till noon, when, pressed by the superior numbers and resistless energy of the enemy, the Prince of Orange also fell back to Quatre Bras, defending the woods around with determined obstinacy. A pause ensues – the French obtain reinforcements, and resume the attack at half-past two in the afternoon, with the full confidence of clearing the way to Brussels. The Belgians are imperilled – they begin to give way – victory is almost within the grasp of the daring Ney, who has everything to gain by success, when Picton’s Division, toil-worn, but animated by the sight of the battle-field, suddenly comes to the rescue.”

[The Life of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington by J. H. (Joachim Hayward) Stocqueler, pp., 18-19.]

An interesting exchange took place between Marshal Ney and General Reille early in the action around Quatre Bras:

“He and Reille had arrived in front of The Netherlanders’ position with the advance guard of II Corps a quarter of an hour earlier [1.45 p.m.]. Ney immediately recognised the importance of the Bois de Bossu on his left [flank]. The Emperor’s orders were to hold the crossroads and prevent Wellington from joining the Prussians. Unless Ney held the wood as well, he would not be able to stop Wellington bypassing his position by way of the track from Hautain-le-Val to the Charleroi road above Frasnes. More immediately, it would be impossible to advance to the crossroads while the enemy occupied the wood along his left flank. Ney remarked to Reille: ‘There is hardly anyone in the Bois de Bossu; we must take it at once.’ Reille, who had fought in more Peninsular battles against Wellington than had Ney, replied cautiously: ‘It may turn out to be one of these Spanish battles, in which the English never appear till their own time is come. It would be prudent to defer our attack until all our troops have mustered here.’ Although Ney replied ‘Nonesense! The companies of voltigeurs can manage it alone!’, he nevertheless waited until 2 p.m.” ………….

“…….. In Ney’s second line was Lefebvre-Desnouêttes Guard Light Cavalry waiting for Kellerman to come up. And indeed Kellerman was already deploying his 1 st Cuirassier Brigade to the left behind Foy, although his other brigade had been left further back at Liberchies, off the Brussels-Charleroi Chausée, and just above the Roman road leading to Wagnelee, whence it would move with d’Erlon’s corps to support the Emperor if necessary .”

[ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 198]

“At about 1400, Bachelu's division advanced to attack the Piraumont farm and Foy advanced in the center, supported by Piré's lancers.

The attack began very slowly and very cautiously because of Reille's fear of running into strong, concealed Allied forces. Before 1500, Gemioncourt and Piraumont were in French hands. In the Bossu wood and at Pierrepoint farm the Dutch-Belgians offered a stiff resistance but had to fall back under the French pressure. They managed, however, to hold the wood.

Perponcher's line was about to crack under the combined attacks of three French divisions when, at about 1500, the first of much needed reinforcements, Picton's division and Merlen's Dutch-Belgian cavalry, arrived. Wellington arrived at about the same time, immediately took command and deployed Picton and Merlen on the left flank.

Shortly after 1500, the French formed a line between Pierrepoint through Gemioncourt to Piraumont.

A cavalry counterattack at 1530, led by the Prince of Orange, was driven back with heavy casualties. At about this time the Duke of Brunswick and his Brunswick contingent arrived to reinforce the Allies.

At 1600, Ney received Napoleon's order, which had been dispatched at 1400, to vigorously attack the enemy in front and come to his assistance at Ligny. Up until this moment, Ney had not appreciated the importance of capturing the crossroads. He sent an aide to I Corps (d'Erlon) to hasten its advance and launched II Corps (Reille) again in a renewed attack. The newly arrived division of Jérôme Bonaparte was to clear the Bossu wood and the eastern outskirts. Foy would attack Quatre-Bras and Bachelu would assault up the Namur road.

D'Erlon's I Corps, however, was by this time marching away from, not toward, Quatre-Bras. D'Erlon, who was proceeding northward on the Brussels Road from Gossilies, was overtaken near Frasnes by a staff officer who, according to d'Erlon, had written orders for d'Erlon to take his corps to Napoleon's assistance at Ligny. There are several versions of this meeting between I Corps and the unknown staff officer (see further down in this text): although d'Erlon insisted there was a written order from the Emperor to change his direction of march, such a document, if it existed, has never been found. Napoleon said that he knew nothing about such an order. Some authorities assume that a well-meaning staff officer who knew Napoleon's plan saw d'Erlon's unemployed corps and took it upon himself to redirect it to Ligny. Some authorities also propose that this same officer may have scribbled the "Imperial order" himself, which would explain why d'Erlon had seen a written order that the Emperor claimed had never been written.

When Ney learned that his much-needed I Corps was marching away, he lost his temper. A few minutes later, Colonel Forbin-Janson, an Imperial aid, arrived with Napoleon's 1515 message. The colonel told him to attack Quatre-Bras at once. The furious Marshall took out his anger on the poor colonel, who was so shocked by this undeserved treatment that he forgot to hand over the written message. Therefore, it wasn't until later that evening, when it was too late, that Ney would receive the message that would have made things clear to him earlier in the day. [My emphasis, RGH]

Meanwhile, at about 1615 at Quatre-Bras, the French, supported by Piré's light cavalry, advanced almost to the crossroads.

The British 42nd, 44th and 92nd regiments held their ground despite heavy casualties and repelled the French advance. Then Piré's lancers charged the British infantry and severely mauled the 42nd and 44th regiments before they were driven off.

Jérôme Bonaparte was more successful. Many of Perponcher's men were driven out of the Bossu wood and the Brunswick contingent, sent to assist Perponcher, was routed during their advance south from Quatre-Bras.

At about this moment a British brigade under Halket, a Hanoverian brigade under Kielmansegge and the Nassau contingent arrived and were immediately deployed to support the hard-pressed Allied line. With these new troops Wellington now had a numerical advantage.

Kellerman, who had arrived with only his forward brigade, received the order to charge Wellington's centre to "overthrow the mass of the Allied infantry." Kellerman was astounded. A cavalry charge without infantry support against formed enemy infantry was suicide and would certainly lead to the destruction of his brigade. He asked Ney to confirm the order. Ney replied by saying "Go, but go then!"

Infuriated by this insane order, Kellerman charged with his cuirassiers and against all odds succeeded. They decimated the 69th Regiment, routed the 33rd Regiment and found themselves in possession of the crossroads. However, without infantry support and being fired upon by a concealed battery at almost point-blank range and two British regiments, Kellerman had to give up his hard-won prize and return to the French lines. During the retreat, Kellerman's horse was killed and he barely escaped capture by clinging onto the bits of two cuirassier's horses .”

[ http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/hundred/c_chapter3.html ]

The Allied/Hanoverian 3 rd Division was commanded by Lieutenant- General Count Charles von Alten, with the 5th British Brigade, commanded by Major-General Sir Colin Halkett, which comprised:

2nd Battalion/30th (Cambridgeshire) Regiment , commanded by Major Morris William Bailey – 635 men

1st Battalion/33rd (1st Yorkshire West Riding) Regiment , commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William Keith Elphinstone – 561 men

2nd Battalion/69th (South Lincolnshire) Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Morris

2nd Battalion/73rd (Highland) Regiment , commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William George Harris – 562 men.

“The third English division, under General Alten, consisting of the 5th British brigade under Sir C. Halket; the 2d brigade of the king’s German legion, under Colonel Ompteda; and the 1st Hanoverian brigade, under Gen. Kielmansegge; arrived next on the field, in time to sustain a fresh attack, made by the enemy about four o’clock. Strong columns attacked the right of the allied position, and endeavoured to obtain possession of the Bois de Bossu and out-buildings in front of Quatre Bras: the action became very severe, the enemy, with a greatly superior force of artillery, poured a most destructive fire on the 3d division, which had great difficulty in sustaining its ground: the 5th brigade, consisting of the 30th, 33d, 69th, and 73d regiments, suffered great loss, especially the 33d and 69th, whose ranks, weakened by the enemy’s artillery, were inadequate to resist the daring attacks of the French cavalry, and the 33d effected its retreat into the Bois de Bossu. At this critical juncture, when the enemy had almost succeeded in establishing his light troops on the great road of Nivelles, the 1st English division, under General Cooke, consisting of the 1st brigade of guards under Major-General Maitland, and the 2d brigade of guards under Major-General Byng, with Captain Sandham’s and Major Kuhlman’s brigades of artillery, arrived about half past six o’clock on the field of action, after a fatiguing march from their cantonments around Enghien.”

[An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, Illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo; Battle of Quatre Bras; http://napoleonic-literature.com/index.html ]

FRENCH HEAVY CAVALRY ATTACK AT QUATRE BRAS

It is necessary also to examine the tactics and deployment of French units. By far the most respected of all the French cavalry were the breast-plated, high-crested, heavy cavalry, epitomised by the regiments of Cuirassiers. They were large men on large black horses, and provided they were backed up by their own horse artillery they were almost un-stoppable. The following diagram shows a squadron of French heavy cavalry drawn up in battle order, involving the squadron presenting its full double row length of 48m. excluding officers and NCO’s beyond the extremities of the second rank. A regiment so developed could either have all its squadrons in line, running from the 1 st to the 4 th from respectively right to left; or, one behind the other with 9m. between the back of the leading squadron and the front of the next one behind, with the 1 st leading, and the 2 nd, 3 rd, and 4 th consecutively following.

Key to diagram: A = Adjutant. Am = Adjutant-major. C = Captain. L = Lieutenant. SI = Sous Lieutenant. Mc = Maréchal-des-Logis-chef. M = Maréchal-des-Logis. Bf = Brigadier-fourrier. B = Brigadier.

[Napoleon’s Cavalry, by Emir Bukhari, colour plates by Angus McBride, Osprey Publishing London, 1979, ISBN 0 85045 339 9, p. 13]

French 3rd Cavalry Corps

Commanded by Lieutenant General – Général de Division - Francois Etienne Kellerman, Comte de Valmy

Comprised 3,856 men in the following:

11th Cavalry Division , commanded by Général de Division Baron Samuel-Francois l’Hériter

1st Brigade , commanded by Général de Brigade Baron Piquet

2nd Regiment of Dragoons, Colonel Planzeaux

7th Regiment of Dragoons, Colonel Léopold

1,110 men.

2nd Brigade , commanded by Général de Brigade Baron Guiton

8th Regiment of Cuirassiers, Colonel Garavaque

11th Regiment of Cuirassiers, Colonel Courtier

791 men

Division d’Artillerie

3rd Battery 2nd Regiment of Horse Artillery, commanded by Captain de Marcillac, , 4 x 6lb guns, 2 x 5.5” howitzers.

161 men

12th Cavalry Division , commanded by Général de Division Baron Roussel d’Hurbal

1st Brigade , commanded by Général de Brigade Baron Blanchard

1st Regiment of Carabineers, Colonel Rogé

2nd Regiment of Carabineers, Colonel Beugnat

847 men

2nd Brigade , commanded by Général de Brigade Chevalier Donop

2nd Regiment of Cuirassiers, Colonel Baron Grandjean

3rd Regiment of Cuirassiers, Colonel Thurbot

791 men

Division d’Artillerie ,

2nd Battery 2nd Regiment of Horse Artillery commanded by Captain Lebau, 4 x 6lb guns, 2 x 5.5” howitzers

156 men.

Translation of Kellermann's Report to Ney after the charge of the brigade of Guiton's cuirassiers.

Near Frasnes, June 16, 1815 - 10 H PM

Sir - Marshal,

I executed the charge that you have ordered me to do; I encountered the enemy infantry, posted in a small valley beneath their guns. On the spot, without giving the troops time to think, I rushed at the head of the 1st squadron of the 8th with Gal Guiton, against the Anglo-Hanoverian infantry, in spite of the extensive fire, from the front and the flanks. Both lines of infantry were knocked over, the greatest disorder was in the enemy line, which we crossed two - three times, the most complete success was ensured [here was added a space line : With the results which you was waiting for], if the lancers would have followed us, the cuirassiers, shot upon from all sides, could not exploit the advantage that they had obtained by this most resolute and fearless charge against an infantry which did not let itself be intimidated and which they fired with the greatest coolness as if during an exercise.

We took a flag of the 69th which was taken by the cuirassiers Valgayer and Mourassin [ added with pencil by another hand: Albisson and Henry?]. The brigade having taken an enormous loss and seeing that they were not supported, withdrew in the usual disorder as in similar circumstances, my horse was knocked down by two shots, and I fell under it. I was barely able to escape. The Gal Guiton, the Colonel Cavaraque were unhorsed as well as numerous officers and cuirassiers. I was hurt in the knee and the leg, but nevertheless, I shall be there tomorrow on horseback. The division Roussel is bivouacking in the plain, close to Frasnes, Lhéritier's division did not join, I will try to address orders to him.

I am respectfully

Signed: the count of Valmy (Kellermann, the young )

[ http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterlooorders8.html ]

From the above passages, it seems the 33 rd had a particularly hard time of things, further detail is provided by another source which says:

“He [Ney] ordered Kellermann to charge his cuirassier brigade at the crossroads. When Kellermann pointed out that he had, at the Marshal’s order, only one brigade, Ney replied ‘My dear General, a supreme effort is now necessary; that mass of hostile infantry [Halkett’s brigade] must be overthrown. The fate of France is in your hands. Take your cavalry and ride them down. Go! I will support you with all Piré’s cavalry. Once again the fate of France had changed hands. Kellermann returned to his cuirassiers and, leading them off, ordered the Gallop, then the Charge, as 1,000 steel-clad heavy horsemen gained speed. Kellermann’s onrush was to be followed closely by all Piré’s remaining 800 cavalry, and the rest of the three infantry divisions, in an all-out effort to shatter Wellington’s hold on Quatre Bras.

The men of Halkett’s Brigade were in the path of Kellermann’s charge. The tall rye hid the onrushing cuirassiers from the view of the British infantryin line between the Charleroi road and the wood, but the drumming of 4,000 hooves could be heard plainly enough, and even felt in the soles of their feet. The 30 th and 33 rd Battalions formed square first. The 69 th was about to follow suit when two companies were given a wrong order by Major Lindsay. He called for the 1 st and 2 nd Companies to “Face to right about, in open column, and commence firing upon the cuirassiers.” This blunder left one side of the 69 th‘s square open. When the cuirassiers burst upon the malformed square, they were able to charge in and cut it up badly. The 69 th‘s King’s Colour was taken and its men broke for the woods. The 73 rd were panicked, by the fate of the 69 th, and they too broke and ran for the woods. The 33 rd, formed on a knoll, became the target of Kellermann’s horse artillery, which cut them up with canister, causing them to follow the others who had broken. ”

[ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; pp., 219-220]

Silborne says this: “The 33 rd Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel Elphistone), had formed square upon its leading Company (the Grenadiers) at the moment the latter had reached some rising ground; in which position be became a conspicuous mark for the fire, at point blank distance, of a French Battery which opened upon it with great spirit. It was deemed advisable to deploy it [the battalion RGH] into line, in which formation the regiment advanced towards the two Brunswick battalions then fiercely engaged with the Enemy’s Light Troops near the skirt of the wood; but upon approaching the latter, a report was spread along the line that French cavalry was in its rear, whereupon the Regiment rushed precipitously into the wood, within which it was speedily reformed…..

………”Halkett’s Brigade, with the Brunswickers, resolutely maintained the ground on which they had been charged by the French Cavalry. As the latter retired, the Light Companies of the Brigade, with a portion of the Brunswickers on the right, and some Hanoverian riflemen on the left, advanced in pursuit. The French threw forward a line of Tirailleurs to check them, and a brisk fire was maintained on both sides. he cannonade on this side of the field was also kept up with great spirit. At length, the French Cavalry advanced, forcing back Halkett’s skirmishers upon their respective columns, on which they [the French cavalry] then charged. Their attack however was not made with much energy, and, upon their being uniformly repulsed, the Light Troops resumed their former ground. Halkett pushed forward his battalions to the line of his skirmishers, and then, moving towards his right, in the direction of the ravine, which descends from the wood, drove across the rivulet a body of French Infantry, from which a portion of his Brigade ad suffered a severe fire. In this part of the affair, one of Picton’s Battalions, the Royals, co-operated.”

[The Waterloo Campaign, 1815, by William Siborne, pp., 180 &187-8]

The names of the officers who were present with the 33 rd on the 16 th June were:

Lieutenant Colonel :

W.K. Elphinstone

Majors :

G. Colclough

E. Parkinson

Captains

W. McKintyre; C. Knight; J. Haigh; J. M. Harty; R. Gore; J. Longden

Lieutenants

T. Reid; G. Barrs; H. R. Buck; A. H. Trevor; J. Boyce; A. Gore; J. Hart; J. Markland;

T. H. Patterson; R. Westmore; T. D. Haigh; G. Whannel; J. G. Ogle; S. A. Pagan; E. Clabon

J. Lynam; J. Archibald; J. Forlong; J. Cameron;

Ensigns

H. Bain; J. Alderson; J. A. Howard; A. Watson; C. Smith; W. Hodson; G. Blackall; G. Drury; W. H. Grote

Paymaster

E. Stoddart

Adjutant

W. Thain

Quarter Master

J. Fazakerly

Surgeon

R. Learer

Assistant Surgeons

W. Fry

D. Finlayson

Casualties listed for the 33 rd after this encounter were as follows:

Captain John Haigh; Lieutenants John Boyce and Arthur Gore were killed; the wounded were, Major Edward Parkinson, slightly; Captain William M'Intyre, slightly; Lieutenants James Markland, J. G. Ogle, and James Forlong, severely; Ensign John Alderson, severely (right arm amputated); Ensign James Howard, slightly.

[ http://www.napoleonic-literature.com/WE/Casualties-16_June.html ]

The numbers of rank and file killed of wounded during this episode have proved so far, elusive, but efforts on my part to ascertain them will continue.

While Ney had been pressing the Allied troops for possession of the crossroads at Quatre Bras, the Emperor had been trying to deliver a sufficiently crushing blow on the Prussians to send them reeling back from the whole theatre, thereby depriving Wellington of his support. At the Battle of Ligny - and I apologise for the brevity of this section of narrative – Blucher, whilst being beaten on the ground, had not however been mauled enough to suspend the original combined strategy. He therefore ordered his withdrawal northwards towards Wavre rather than eastwards, by which action he was still in a position to assist Wellington when Napoleon turned his full might on the Allies. His withdrawal from the area of Ligny however left open Wellington’s left flank, which, had the French communications been as they should, could have seen Grouchy and Napoleon attacking Wellington from that quarter. The Prussian retreat meant therefore that Wellington too had to withdraw, and as night fell on the 16 th of June, so began the brief march north to Wellington’s chosen ground. One source sums up the day thus: “By 9 p.m. with the light waning, the struggle for Quatre Bras was ended for the day. Ney withdrew slowly and in good order towards Fasnes. Wellington’s cavalry had begun to arrive in penny packets, but there was little light left, and being fatigued by their long march they were in no condition to dispute with Kellermann and Piré.

Ney had nothing to reproach himself for in the day’s proceedings. Thrown into his command at the eleventh hour, with only three infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades, Ney had by skill and stubborn courage succeeded in fulfilling the intent of his original orders; he had prevented Wellington from aiding Blucher for the whole of the 16 th…….. He could not have known that the enemy obviously concentrating right in front of him would take so long to achieve superiority and would not succeed in defeating his force.

Wellington had less with which to be content. He had fought the most confused battle of his career, more or less by accident. His staff had let him down badly over the concentration of his army Fortunately, though, his Netherland, Brunswick, Nassau, Hanoverian and British troops had all worked well together, managing to hold the crossroads and finishing the day with an advance. But it was the nearest Wellington had come to suffering a major defeat, and he had still to face a better general than Ney commanding a much larger force .”

[ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; p., 221]

“Thus closed the events of the 16th. The French troops, under the immediate orders of Napoleon, bivouacked on the Prussian position of Ligny; those under Marshal Ney on the position of Frasne; whilst the troops under the Duke of Wellington bivouacked on the field of battle of Quatre Bras. With the approach of night the weather became overcast, it was followed by rain, and the cold became severe, but the fatigue which the troops had undergone in their long march and during the action, rendered the approach of night, with all its disadvantages, most enviable.

At three o’clock in the morning of the 17th the troops at Quatre Bras were again called to arms by the noise of some skirmishing on the outposts; all supposed that the enemy was going to try to effect what he had failed in the day before, but the firing soon ceased. Parties of men were then sent out to collect those of the wounded who had not been removed the former evening, and in this way they were occupied till nine o’clock, when a great change was made in the British line. The Brunswick, Belgian, and Nassau troops, which had been on the left of the Bois de Bossu on the former day, now moved to its right. The first brigade of guards occupied the wood with its light troops, having its reserves in the rear; the 2d brigade of guards occupied the ground contiguous to Quatre Bras; the 3d and 5th English divisions were on their left, extending in front of Sarta Mavelines, and occupying the village of Pierremont with their outposts. –– The cavalry, which had arrived on the evening of the 16th, formed line in rear of the whole. Reports were circulated that an attack was about to be made on the enemy’s position, and that it was only delayed till arrangements could be made to act in concert with the army of Marshal Blucher, when at ten o’clock news was received that the main body of the Prussian army had retreated towards Wavre. This intelligence rendered it probable that Napoleon would now move all his disposable force to attack the Duke of Wellington’s position; and as that part of the army of the Netherlands which had assembled on this point would, in that case, have been unable to maintain its ground against the enemy, without the co-operation of the Prussians, a retreat became indispensable; the cavalry formed line to cover it, and before eleven, the different divisions commenced retiring along the roads leading to the several points of a position it was intended they should occupy in front of the forest of Soignes, the principal line of retreat being along the great road leading from Quatre Bras through Genappe. As the infantry retired, the cavalry gradually followed the same track, and watched the movements of the enemy, who now began a sluggish pursuit .”

[Napoleonic Literature; An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, Illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo, Observations on Ligny and Quatre Bras; http://napoleonic-literature.com/index.html ]

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