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FRENCH CONCENTRATION Belgian Frontier
The difficulty of tactical manoeuvring consists of turning the devious into the direct… [The Art of War by Sun Tzu, vii, Manoeuvring , iii.] Orders were now dispatched for the concentration of the Grand Army; and in order to mask its movements as much as possible, the whole line of the Belgian frontier was studded with numerous detachments of the National Guards furnished by the garrisons of the fortresses, more especially along that part of the frontier that passes in advance of Valenciennes, Condé, Lille, and even as far as Dunkirk; all the debouches of which line were strongly occupied, the Outposts tripled, and there was every apparent indication that either the principal attack, or at least a formidable diversion, was in course of preparation in that quarter. These measures had the effect of strengthening the anticipations which Wellington had previously formed of offensive movements from the side of Lille and Valenciennes and consequently of placing him still more upon his guard against any hasty and incautious junction of his forces with those of Blucher, until fully satisfied as to the true direction and object of Napoleon’s operations. On the 12 th June Lieutenant Colonel Wissell, whose regiment, the 1 st Hussars of the King’s German Legion formed an extensive line of outposts in front of Tournai, reported to Major General Sir Hussey Vivian, to whose brigade the regiment belonged, that he had ascertained, from information on which he could rely, that the French army had assembled on the frontier, and was preparing to attack. Vivian desired him to report upon the subject to Lord Hill, to whose corps his regiment was attached while employed upon this particular service. [The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 by William Siborne, pp. 90 - 91] Thus it was according to Silborne [the first, and for a long time thereafter, considered the ONLY true narrative of the battle RGH], how the British/Allied command became aware of French offensive intentions. Descriptions vary slightly about the concentration of French forces, but one thing is certain, Napoleon was the past-master of this initial strategic manoeuvring – the opening gambit. His intention was to drive a wedge between the forces of Wellington who had to protect his line of retreat west towards Antwerp, and those of the Prussian General Blucher, whose natural line of retreat was east towards Prussia. If Napoleon could therefore bluff Wellington into thinking his line of retreat was under threat, then the gap between the Allied and Prussian armies would be increased, thereby allowing Napoleon to drive between them, and defeat the two armies piecemeal. The armies of Wellington and Blucher were equally dependant upon each other, their counter plan was that if the French attacked either one of them, then the other would be available to turn Napoleon’s flank and defeat him. Everything depended upon the bond of trust between the two commanding generals that neither would make a bolt for home as soon as they were perceived to be threatened.
“Setting out from the darkened capital at 3 a.m. in the twelfth [of June] Napoleon and his staff quickly proceeded northwards via Soissons, Laon and Avesnes. Upon reaching Beaumont on the fourteenth, he ordered General Drouet d’Erlon’s 1 st Corps to advance between Avesnes, Maubeurge and Solre-sur-Sambre, Reille’s II nd Corps to station itself between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers and General Vandamme’s III rd Corps along with Lobau’s VI th Corps to take up positions around Beaumont. As for Gérard’s IV th Corps, they were to occupy a position between Philippeville and Florenne, while Grouchy’s Corps de Reserve Cavalry remained at Valcourt, Bossus, and Gayolle. The Imperial Guard under the command of Marshal Mortier were, of course, to remain around Napoleon’s temporary general headquarters at Beaumont. The Emperor gave his usual pre-battle pep talk to his army at Beaumont on the fourteenth.. ” [The Hundred Days, by Alan Schom, Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1993, ISBN 0 7181 3384 6 p. 236] Translated into English, the proclamation declared : “Soldiers, today is the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland, places where the destiny of Europe was decided on two occasions. Accordingly, like after Austerlitz and Wagram, we believed the arguments and the oaths of the princes that we left on their thrones! Today, however, in their coalition against us they take offense at the independence and at the most sacred rights of France. They started their aggressions on a precise manner : let us therefore march to meet them; they and we, are we not the same men? Soldiers, at Jena, against those same Prussians, who are today so arrogant, you were one against three, and at Montmirail, one against six. That those of you who were prisoners of the English tell you their stories of their Pontoons and of the horrible evils that they suffered. The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Rhine Confederation, groan at their obligations to help the cause of the Princes who are enemies of the justice and the rights of all people. They know that this coalition is insatiable. After destroying twelve million Italians, one million Saxons, six millions Belgians, she will devour the smaller States of Germany. The fools! One moment of good fortune blinds them. The oppression and the humiliation of the French people are above their power! If they move into France, they will find their graves. Soldiers! We have to make forced marches, give battles, take risks; but, with steadiness, victory will be ours: the rights, the honour and the welfare of our country will be retaken. For each French who has the courage, the moment has come to win or to die! Napoléon ” [ http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterlooorders1.html ] Not all however was as the Emperor told his men. Primarily his Chief of Staff had always been, for the last 20 years campaigning, Marshal of France Louis-Alexandre Berthier. It was Berthier who was able to transpose the Emperor’s ideas and deeds into orders for the field commanders to follow. His method of sending messengers ensured that at least one world arrive where he had been sent, and that a receipt was signed and delivered back, ensuring complete understanding between Napoleon and all his commanders. Basically he was an administrative genius, to whom Napoleon owed much of his military success. But, Berthier was not Chief of Staff in 1815. The sinister reason why he was not there is that he had been murdered whilst en-route from his place of exile at his castle at Bamberg in Saxony to join with his Emperor and take up his old position once more. He had managed to reach the French frontier, but had been turned back by Allied authorities, whereupon he returned to Bamberg, where he died from either throwing himself out of a window, or being forcibly thrown from such. This single act perhaps beyond any other led to the final outcome of June the 18 th of June. Napoleon had to make other arrangements, and selected the self seeking Soult, known to have ‘changed his coat’ twice, he had however experience of independent command, and while it was known he was nowhere near as efficient as Berthier, as Chief of Staff, Napoleon could at least ‘keep and eye’ on him. [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; pp., 86, 118-120]
In addition to this severe blow to his command structure, Napoleon was no longer the man he had been. Twenty years campaigning had taken its toll, and further, there is more than a suggestion that he was already suffering from the effects of arsenic poisoning. “ It's important to be aware that Napoleon did not die from arsenic poisoning, but instead was poisoned to death in two phases, by a method used by professional poisoners of the period. The "classical method" of killing somebody without making it appears to be a criminal act consisted of a "cosmetic phase" followed by a "lethal phase." The "cosmetic phase" of Napoleon's poisoning started in mid-1816, and this was done through the use of arsenical intoxication. There is, however, evidence that the intoxication by arsenic was used during the Waterloo campaign, several months before Napoleon's exile [My emphasis RGH]. Arsenic is an essentially colourless, odourless and tasteless substance which is easily administered in food or wine, and the total quantity needed to carry out a planned assassination would have fitted into a small envelope.” [ http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/weider/c_assassination_w.html ] There is however at least one other theory which says , with less assertion “… after the battle of Dresden, fought amidst pouring rain, he was afflicted by severe vomiting and diarrhoea, which was at the time put down to some garlic in a mutton stew or some off-colour pâté-de-foie-gras [sic] that he had eaten, but once again the timing and nature of the indisposition gives one cause to wonder, as toxicologists will declare the odour of garlic under certain conditions is barely distinguishable from that of arsenic. Throughout the following month, Napoleon was plunged into despondency and relative inactivity, finding it hard to make firm decisions. Then at Leipzig, on the night of 17-18 October, he was again attacked by severe stomach pains and lay doubled-up on his camp bed. "I feel bad. My mind resists but my body gives in." Was this, as Kemble asserts, duodenitis [sic] arising from a prolonged anxiety state ... or due to something much more sinister? The most frequently discussed indisposition occurred within the period of the climactic series of engagements that ended Napoleon active career. It was an illness that struck on the night of 16-17 June, 1815, immediately after the battle of Ligny, when it required the ministrations of Prince Jerôme, Baron Larrey and Marchand to get their imperial master over the crisis. This may have been linked to prolapsed piles [hemroids] associated with complete exhaustion, as some have speculated, although important evidence exist that Napoleon did not, in fact , suffer from this complaint, as his faithful valet attested. [11] Whatever the cause of his illness that night, its effect on his power to reach decisions on the morning of the 17th proved critical. Instead of issuing effective orders for the proper pursuit of the defeated Prussians and the coordination of efforts with Marshal Ney required to trap Wellington at or near Quatre Bras, the Emperor spent the whole morning viewing the battlefield of Ligny, the scene of his considerable victory that previous day. This period of hesitation or at least inactivity proved of the utmost importance in determining the outcome at Waterloo and Wavre on the 18th.” [ http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/scholarship97/c_death.html ] Whatever the reason for his illness, Napoleon was no longer the decisive commander in chief he had been, and this too would lead to indecisiveness, confusion and eventual defeat at Waterloo. Wellington meanwhile was completely unaware of Napoleons real intentions, and had kept his army relatively dispersed in an attempt to forestall any and all moves Napoleon might make. By this seemingly anxious attitude, he had without knowing, thwarted the Emperor’s original intention. Consequently, while he advanced towards Charleroi, to threaten the Prussians, the Allied army was nowhere near concentrated and therefore not in a position to be attacked in depth, as he had hoped. As matters then stood, Napoleon faced a possible combined strength of 222.555 men, compared to his own force of 122, 652 men. Not therefore able to attack the Allied army, Napoleon, while still intending to thrust towards Brussels turned his personal attention on the Prussians, who had concentrated at and around Ligny. He sent Marshal Ney orders to occupy and keep the crossroads at the little hamlet of Quatre Bras. In his orders dated the 16 th June [very early in the morning thereof], Napoleon told Ney: “.. I am sending Marshal Grouchy with the 3 rd and 4 th Infantry Corps to Sombreffe. I am taking my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall be there myself before midday. I shall attack the enemy if I find him there, and I shall clear the roads as far as Gembloux. At that place, according to circumstances, I shall come to a decision – perhaps at 3 p.m., and perhaps this evening. My intention is that, immediately after I have made up my mind, you will be ready to march on Brussels. I shall support you with my Guard, who will be at Fleurus, or Sombreffe, and I shall wish you to reach Brussels tomorrow morning. You will set off with your troops this evening, if I make up my mind early enough for you to be informed of my intention by day, and then this evening you will cover three or four leagues [8 to 10 miles] and reach Brussels by 7 a.m. tomorrow morning …… I should desire to have with me the division of Guard [Cavalry] commanded by General Lefebvre-Desnouĕttes …. I do not wish to cause General Lefebvre-Desnouĕttes to take unnecessary marches, since it is probable that I shall decide to march on Brussels this evening with the Guard ….. You understand how much importance is attached to the taking of Brussels. From its capture certain things would happen, because such a quick and sudden movement would cut the English Army from Mons, Ostende, etc I desire that your dispositions may be well conceived, so that at the first order your eight divisions will take the road to Brussels." “It is clear from this letter and others to his wing commanders that at 8 in the morning of the 16 th, Napoleon did not expect either Wellington or Blucher to make a stand against him. Perhaps he thought the Allies would still govern their actions by the tactic of withdrawing before a French army led by him in person.” “I have adopted for this campaign the following general principal, to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. Your wing will be composed of four divisions of the I st Corps , four divisions of the II nd Corps, two divisions of Light Cavalry, and two divisions of the Corps of the Count of Valmy [Kellerman’s Heavy Cavalry]. This ought not to fall short of 45,000 to 50,000 men. Marshal Grouchy will have almost the same force, and will command the right wing. The Guard will form the Reserve, and I shall bring them into action on either wing just as the actual circumstances may dictate. The Major-General [Chief of Staff] issues the most precise orders, so that when you are detached you should not find any difficulty in obeying such orders as you receive; general officers commanding corps will take orders directly from me when I am present in person. Also, according to circumstances I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my Reserve …” [ [Waterloo New Perspective, by David Hamilton-Williams, Arms and Armour Press, 1999 edition by Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1 86019 996 8; pp., 182-3]
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